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Abstract
In a system that performs both encryption and lossy compression, the conventional way is to compress first and
then encrypt the compressed data. This separation approach proves to be optimal. In certain applications where
sensitive information should be protected as early as possible, it is preferable to perform encryption first and
then compress the encrypted data, which leads to the concept of the reversed system. Johnson et al. proposed
an achievability scheme for the reversed system that has a modulo-sum encryption followed by a compression using
Wyner-Ziv distributed source coding with side information. However, this reversed system performs worse than the
conventional system in the sense that it requires more compression rate and secrecy key rate. In this paper, we
propose a new achievability scheme for the reverse system where encryption is conducted by a permutation cipher
and then the encrypted data is compressed using the optimal rate-distortion code. The proposed scheme can achieve
the optimal compression rate and secret key rate, and therefore shows that reversing the order of encryption and
compression does not necessarily compromise the performance of an encryption-compression system. The proposed
system attains weak secrecy, and we show that the information leakage is mainly contributed by the type information
of the sequence, which is not concealed by the permutation cipher. Given the type of the sequence, the rest of the
information leakage vanishes exponentially.
This paper was presented in part at Annual Allerton Conference on Communications, Control and Computing, 2012. This work is partially
supported by the National Basic Research Program of China (973 Program 2012CB316004), the National Natural Science Foundation of China
under Grants 61271208, 61201170 and 61221002, the Research Fund of National Mobile Communications Research Laboratory, Southeast
University (No. 2014A02), the Project-sponsored by SRF for ROCS, SEM and Qing Lan Project.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
It is common for a communication system to incorporate both the encryption and lossy compression functions,
see Fig. 1. For example, distributing videos to authorized users via a public network requires an encryption on the
videos to restrict the access from unauthorized users, and also compression of the videos to adapt to the traffic of
the network.
More formally, we consider an i.i.d. random sequence Xn with distribution PX defined on a finite set X . Assume
a reconstruction set Y where the reconstruction sequence Y n is in Yn. Define a distortion function d : X × Y 7→
{0}
⋃
R
+ and the distortion between xn ∈ Xn and yn ∈ Yn is defined as
d(xn, yn) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
d(xi, yi). (1)
Secret key is defined as a random variable K uniformly distributed on {1, 2, . . . , N}.
A joint encryption-compression system is defined as follows.
f¯ :Xn × {1, 2, . . . , N} 7→ {1, 2, . . . ,M}, (2)
φ¯ :{1, 2, . . . ,M} × {1, 2, . . . , N} 7→ Yn. (3)
From the theory of rate distortion [1] and Shannon cipher [2], under the condition that the normalized information
leakage 1nI(X
n; f¯(Xn,K)) is sufficiently small, for a given distortion constraint D, an outer bound on the the
compression and secret key rate pair (R,Rs) ,
(
1
n logM,
1
n logN
)
in the joint encryption-compression system is
R ≥ min
PY |X :Ed(X,Y )≤D
I(X ;Y ) + ǫ, (4)
Rs ≥ R+ ǫ, (5)
for some arbitrarily small ǫ.
The conventional system separates the functions of compression and encryption as illustrated in Fig. 2. The
system first compresses the source to the given rate, and then encrypts the compressed data with a secret key. At
the receiver side, it first decrypts the received data with the secret key and then performs a reconstruction of the
source. From classical results in information theory [3], we know that the optimal rate distortion code achieves the
bound in (4). Shannon’s work [2] shows that the cipher of modular addition achieves the bound in (5). Therefore,
the conventional system is optimal.
The properties of the conventional system are summarized as follows:
1) Optimality: it achieves the outer bounds in (4) and (5).
2) Perfect secrecy: the information leakage satisfies
I(Xn; f¯(Xn,K)) = 0. (6)
3) Separation of blocks: the encryption and compression functions are separated at the encoder side, and the
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Fig. 1. The joint encryption and lossy compression system
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Fig. 2. The conventional system
reconstruction and decryption functions are separated at the decoder side as well.
In 2004, Johnson et al. [4] suggested that in certain applications, it may be preferable to perform compression
after encryption, i.e., reverse the order of the compression and encryption functions in Fig. 2. The main goal is to
protect the sensitive source by encrypting as early as possible. For example, in the video distribution scenario [4],
the video owner wants to perform the encryption to protect the video contents, but it may not have the incentive to
conduct the compression. The network operator, which is a different entity, desires to compress the data to adapt
to the network traffic. The network operator may not be trusted by the contents distributor and therefore does not
have the access to the secret key. In such a scenario, it is necessary to encrypt the source first and then compress
the encrypted data. In [4], Johnson el al. proposed a reversed system (see Fig. 3) where compression is performed
after encryption.
In the achievability scheme for the reversed system proposed in [4], the source is first encrypted by a modulo-
sum cipher with the help of a secret key, and then compressed by a Wyner-Ziv source encoder [5]. At the receiver
side, joint reconstruction-decryption is conducted by viewing the secret key as side information and performing the
Wyner-Ziv decoding procedure.
We note that the reversed system in [4] has the following properties:
1) Sub-optimality: it in general does not achieve the outer bounds in (4) and (5).
2) Weak secrecy: the information leakage in this reversed system is
1
n
I(Xn; f¯(Xn,K)) ≤ ǫ, (7)
for some arbitrarily small ǫ, which is also the secrecy requirement in [6].
3) Semi-separation of the blocks: in this reversed system, the compression and the encryption functions are
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Fig. 3. The reversed system in [4]
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Fig. 4. The proposed reversed system with the permutation cipher
separated at the encoder side, but the reconstruction and decryption functions are performed jointly at the
decoder side, because the secret key is viewed as the side information in the Wyner-Ziv decompression
process.
In this paper, we propose a new achievability scheme for the reversed system. It consists of a permutation
cipher followed by the optimal rate-distortion code. The proposed system achieves the same compression rate and
secret key rate as the conventional system, i.e., (4) and (5), and therefore is optimal. As a result, we show that
the performance of the joint compression-encryption system is not necessarily compromised when reversing the
order of the blocks. We further study the performance of the permutation cipher. Unlike the modulo-sum cipher,
the permutation cipher does not conceal the empirical distribution or “type” (see [1]) information of the source
sequence Xn, which we denote as PXn . The type information is at the order of logn and the leakage of the type
information does not violate the weak secrecy criterion as in (7). We will show that given the type of Xn, the
information leakage of the proposed reversed system converges to zero exponentially.
In summary, the proposed reversed system based on permutation cipher has the following properties:
1) Optimality: it achieves the outer bounds in (4) and (5).
2) Weak secrecy: the type information is not concealed. But, given the type, the information leakage vanishes
exponentially, i.e.,
1
n
I(Xn; f¯(Xn,K)) ≤
1
n
H(PXn) +
1
n
I(Xn; f¯(Xn,K))|PXn), (8)
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5and
H(PXn) ≤ |X | log(n+ 1), (9)
I(Xn; f¯(Xn,K))|PXn) ≤ exp(−nµ). (10)
3) Separation of blocks: the encryption and compression functions are separated at the encoder side, and the
reconstruction and decryption functions are separated at the decoder side as well.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We propose the permutation cipher based reversed system in
the next section. In section III, we will show that given the type, the information leakage of the proposed system
vanishes exponentially, which is followed by the conclusion.
II. REVERSED SYSTEM BASED ON PERMUTATION CIPHER
In this paper, we propose a reversed system consisting of a permutation cipher and a lossy compressor as in Fig.
4. We define the encryption and decryption functions as
f : Xn × {1, 2, . . . , N} 7→ Xn, (11)
φ : Yn × {1, 2, . . . , N} 7→ Yn, (12)
and compression and reconstruction functions as
g : Xn 7→ {1, 2, . . . ,M}, (13)
ϕ : {1, 2, . . . ,M} 7→ Yn. (14)
For encryption-decryption blocks, we have the following two kinds of permutation ciphers, which we refer to as
type I and type II permutation cipher.
A. Type I Permutation Cipher
The type I permutation cipher stores a group of permutations, and the value of the secret key is used to determine
the specific permutation being used for the encryption. More specifically, assume N elements from the symmetric
group Sn, namely {π1, π2, . . . , πN} ⊂ Sn, stored in the type I permutation cipher. Let K denote the random key,
which is uniformly distributed on {1, 2, . . . , N}. The source Xn is an i.i.d. sequence with length n according to
the distribution PX . The encryption function of type I permutation cipher operates as
f(Xn,K) = πK(X
n), (15)
and the decryption function is
φ(Y n,K) = π−1K (Y
n). (16)
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6B. Type II Permutation Cipher
One shortcoming of the type I permutation cipher we considered above is that exponentially many different
permutations need to be stored in the both encryptor and decryptor, which is impractical. In 1982, Ahlswede
and Dueck proposed in [7] to construct a large group of permutations via the composition of a smaller number of
permutations (also see [8, Section 4.2]). Inspired by [7], [8], we consider the following permutation cipher, which we
refer to as type II permutation cipher. We choose L , ⌈logN⌉ permutations from the symmetric group Sn and label
them as σ1, σ2, . . . , σL. We then express the secret key in the form of a binary sequence as K = (K1,K2, . . . ,KL),
where Ki ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, 2, . . . , L. We define the function
fKi ,

 σi if Ki = 1
i if Ki = 0
i = 1, 2, . . . , L, (17)
where i represents the identity mapping on {1, 2, . . . , n}. The resulting permutation πK is defined as
πK , fKL ◦ fKL−1 ◦ · · · ◦ fK2 ◦ fK1 , (18)
where ◦ denotes the composition of the functions. The encryption and decryption functions take on the same form
as (15) and (16), with πK defined in (18).
Compared with the type I permutation cipher, which needs to store N permutations, the type II permutation cipher
only needs to store L = ⌈logN⌉ permutations. However, the type I permutation cipher only needs to perform one
permutation operation at both the encryption and the decryption, while the type II permutation cipher may require
up to L permutation operations at both the encryption and the decryption.
C. Optimality of Compression Rate
Whether a type I or type II permutation cipher is used, we always have that the output of the permutation cipher,
i.e., πK(Xn), has the same distribution as the source Xn, since the source has an i.i.d. distribution. Thus, we can
use a lossy compressor for the distribution PX as if the encryption/decryption pair does not exist. Rate-distortion
theory guarantee that there exists a good lossy compressor achieving the outer bound in (4), which shows the
optimality of the permutation cipher based reversed system regarding the rate of compression. We will show the
optimality of the encryption, i.e., (5), in the next section.
III. INFORMATION LEAKAGE OF THE PERMUTATION CIPHER
In this section, we prove that when the secret key rate satisfies (5), the information leakage of the permutation
cipher based reverse system satisfies (8)-(10), which shows that optimality of the encryption for the permutation
cipher.
As we mentioned in the Section I, the permutation cipher does not conceal the type information of the source
sequence Xn. Actually, the type of Xn should be provided to the compressor to achieve a satisfactory performance
for the compression. We also note that the type information, i.e., H(PXn), is upper bounded by |X | log(n+1) [1],
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7which is at the order of logn and the leakage of which does not violate the standard of weak secrecy. This proves
(9). Next, we will focus on the rest of the information leakage given the type information and prove (10). We will
follow a similar argument as in [1, Chap. 17] and prove that given the type of the source sequence, the information
leakage of the permutation cipher converges to zero exponentially.
We first consider a random permutation cipher, which represents the randomization among all the type I per-
mutation ciphers, as follows. We assume Π = {π1, π2, . . . , πN} satisfies that πi is uniformly distributed in the
symmetric group Sn for i = 1, 2, . . . , N and π1, π2, . . . , πN are mutually independent.
With respect to the randomization among all the type II permutation ciphers, we assume L = ⌈logN⌉ permutations
σ1, σ2, . . . , σL where σi is uniformly distributed in the symmetric group Sn for i = 1, 2, . . . , L and σ1, σ2, . . . , σL
are mutually independent. The resulting permutations Π = {π1, π2, · · · , πN} as defined in (18) satisfy that πi is
uniformly distributed in the symmetric group Sn for i = 1, 2, . . . , N and π1, π2, . . . , πN are pairwise independent
[8, section 4.2].
We note that the random type I and type II permutation ciphers share the same marginal distribution. The
difference is that the permutations in the random type I permutation cipher are mutually independent while the
permutations in the random type II permutation cipher are pairwise independent.
We consider a compression function g : Xn 7→ {1, 2, . . . ,M}. Let us focus on a specific type P , which is not
necessarily equal to PX , i.e., the distribution of the i.i.d. source.
Lemma 1 The information leakage I(Xn; g(πK(Xn))|Xn ∈ T nP ,Π) over random permutation cipher Π is upper
bounded by
I(Xn; g(πK(X
n))|Xn ∈ T nP ,Π) ≤ T1 + T2 + T3, (19)
where for some sufficiently large ∆ > 0 and sufficiently small δ > 0, we have
T1 =
M
∆
log |T nP | , (20)
T2 =

 log |T
n
P | 2 exp
(
− δ
2
2(2+δ)
N
∆
)
for type I permutation cipher
log |T nP |
(
δ2N∆
)−1 for type II permutation cipher , (21)
T3 = δ. (22)
The detailed proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix A. Here we provide a brief overview of the proof.
We note that the information leakage with random permutation cipher and given type is as follows
I(Xn; g(πK(X
n))|Xn ∈ T nP ,Π)
= H(Xn|Xn ∈ T nP )−H(X
n|g(πK(X
n)), Xn ∈ T nP ,Π). (23)
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8Given Xn ∈ T nP , the source is uniformly distributed in the type T nP , i.e.,
Pr(Xn = xn|Xn ∈ T nP ) =
1
|T nP |
, xn ∈ T nP . (24)
To make the information leakage small, essentially, we need to make the following conditional probability
Pr(Xn = xn|Xn ∈ T nP , g(πK(X
n)) = j,Π = {π1, . . . , πN}), (25)
close to uniform distribution 1
|T nP |
.
We consider the following set
g−1P (j) , {x
n ∈ T nP : g(x
n) = j}, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}. (26)
We pass the above set through the inverse of the permutations π1, . . . , πN and obtain the following N sets
π−11
(
g−1P (j)
)
, π−12
(
g−1P (j)
)
. . . , π−1N
(
g−1P (j)
)
. (27)
To make the conditional probability in (25) close to the uniform distribution, we essentially need that the N sets in
(27) form a cover of the type T nP and every sequence in the type is covered by about the same number of sets in
(27). In other word, the permutations (π1, . . . , πN ) are well spread. However, the above goal will not be achieved
if either of the following two events happens
1) The size of the set g−1(j) is too small, which will cause the union of the sets in (27) to be not large enough
to cover the whole type. To identify these small sets, we use a threshold 1∆ in the sense that the size of a
set g−1(j) with size less than |T
n
P
|
∆ is called a small set. This event contributes to the term T1 in the upper
bound of the information leakage in Lemma 1.
2) Permutations are not well spread such that the conditional distribution is not close to the uniform distribution,
by which we mean ∣∣∣∣Pr (Xn = xn∣∣Xn ∈ T nP , πK(Xn) ∈ g−1P (j),Π) − 1|T nP |
∣∣∣∣ > δ|T nP | . (28)
This event contributes to the term T2 in the upper bound in Lemma 1.
When the above two events are not happening, the conditional distribution is close to the uniform distribution and
the corresponding information leakage is represented by the term T3 in Lemma 1.
Now we begin to evaluate the upper bound specified in Lemma 1. We assume ǫ = 1n log
N
M , and let
∆ = M exp(
1
2
nǫ), (29)
N = ∆exp(
1
2
nǫ), (30)
δ = exp
(
−
1
6
nǫ
)
. (31)
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9We evaluate the information leakage given in Lemma 1 for the type I permutation cipher as follows
I(Xn; g(πK(X
n))|Xn ∈ T nP ,Π)
≤
(
exp(−
1
2
nǫ) + 2 exp
(
−
1
5
exp
(
1
6
nǫ
)))
|X | log(n+ 1) + exp
(
−
1
6
nǫ
)
≤ exp
(
−
1
7
nǫ
)
. (32)
Similarly, we can evaluation the information leakage for the type II permutation cipher as follows
I(Xn; g(πK(X
n))|Xn ∈ T nP ,Π)
≤
(
exp(−
1
2
nǫ) + exp
(
−
1
6
nǫ
))
|X | log(n+ 1) + exp
(
−
1
6
nǫ
)
≤ exp
(
−
1
7
nǫ
)
. (33)
Next, we have
I(Xn; g(πK(X
n))|PXn) =
∑
P
Pr(PXn = P )I(Xn; g(πK(Xn))|Xn ∈ T nP )
≤
∑
P
Pr(PXn = P ) exp
(
−
1
7
nǫ
)
≤ exp
(
−
1
7
nǫ
)
. (34)
Therefore, we can conclude that there exists deterministic permutation ciphers, both type I and type II, with
exponentially small information leakage. This result is summarized in the next theorem.
Theorem 1 For any compression function g with rate R, secrecy rate Rs > R, and sufficiently large n, there exist
both type I and type II permutation ciphers with rate Rs and µ > 0 such that the information leakage given type
satisfies
I(Xn; g(πK(X
n))|PXn) ≤ exp(−nµ). (35)
Theorem 1 proves (10) and concludes the proof of the optimality of encryption of the permutation cipher in our
proposed reversed system.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a reversed system of joint encryption and lossy compression by reversing the order
of the encryption and compression blocks in the conventional system. We suggested to use the permutation cipher
to encrypt the i.i.d source first and then compress the encrypted data using an ordinary lossy compressor. The
proposed reversed system based on permutation cipher can achieve the optimal compression rate and secret key
rate, same as in the conventional compression-first-encryption-second system. It shows that reversing the order of
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encryption and compression does not necessarily lead to performance loss of an encryption-compression system.
We then studied the performance of the permutation cipher and proved that given the type, the information leakage
of the permutation cipher vanishes exponentially.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
For simplicity, we define short forms for the conditional distribution as follows
P (xn|{π1, . . . , πN}, j) , Pr(X
n = xn|Xn ∈ T nP , πK(X
n) ∈ g−1P (j),Π = {π1, . . . , πN}), (36)
P (j) , Pr(πK(X
n) ∈ g−1P (j)|X
n ∈ T nP ), (37)
P (xn|j) , Pr(Xn = xn|Xn ∈ T nP , πK(X
n) ∈ g−1P (j)), (38)
P ({π1, . . . , πN}|x
n, j) , Pr(Π = {π1, . . . , πN}|X
n ∈ T nP , X
n = xn, πK(X
n) ∈ g−1P (j)). (39)
We analyze the information leakage with a random permutation cipher and a given type as follows
I(Xn; gP (πK(X
n))|Xn ∈ T nP ,Π)
= H(Xn|Xn ∈ T nP )−H(X
n|gP (πK(X
n)), Xn ∈ T nP ,Π)
= log |T nP | −H(X
n|gP (πK(X
n)), Xn ∈ T nP ,Π) (40)
=
M∑
j=1
P (j)
∑
xn∈T n
P
P (xn|j)
∑
{pi1,...,piN}⊂Sn
P ({π1, . . . , πN}|x
n, j)
[
log |T nP | − log
1
P (xn|{π1, . . . , πN}, j)
]
,
(41)
where (40) follows from (24).
We consider the first event, i.e., the set g−1P (j) is too small. We note that if the set g
−1
P (j) is too small, the fact
that the encrypted data πK(Xn) falls into the set g−1P (j) will reveal quite some information about the source Xn.
To identify these small sets, we use a threshold 1∆ in the sense that the size of a set g
−1
P (j) with size less than
T n
P
∆
is called a small set. More specifically, for function g, type P , we define set E(g, P,∆) as
E(g, P,∆) ,
{
xn ∈ g−1P (j) :
∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣
|T nP |
≥
1
∆
, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}
}
, (42)
and define the following quantity
η(g, P,∆) = 1−
|E(g, P,∆)|
|T nP |
. (43)
Here, E(g, P,∆) represents the union of all the “normal” sets in the type and η(g, P,∆) represents the ratio of the
small sets in the type to the whole type. We note that
Pr(πK(X
n) = xn|Xn ∈ T nP ) =
1
|T nP |
, (44)
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therefore, we can interpret the quantity η(g, P,∆) as
η(g, P,∆) = Pr(πK(X
n) /∈ E(g, P,∆)|Xn ∈ T nP ). (45)
We also note that
M = |g| ≥
η(g, P,∆) |T nP |
|T nP |
∆
, (46)
where the inequality follows from the fact that the number of all the sets g−1P (j) is larger than the number of all
the small sets g−1P (j). The above inequality implies
Pr(πK(X
n) /∈ E(g, P,∆)|Xn ∈ T nP ) = η(g, P,∆) ≤
M
∆
. (47)
Therefore, we upper bound the information leakage in (41) as follows
I(Xn; gP (πK(X
n))|Xn ∈ T nP ,Π)
=
∑
j:g−1
P
(j)*E(g,P,∆)
P (j)
∑
xn∈T n
P
P (xn|j)
∑
{pi1,...,piN}⊂Sn
P ({π1, . . . , πN}|x
n, j)
[
log |T nP | − log
1
P (xn|{π1, . . . , πN}, j)
]
+
+
∑
j:g−1
P
(j)⊆E(g,P,∆)
P (j)
∑
xn∈T n
P
P (xn|j)
∑
{pi1,...,piN}⊂Sn
P ({π1, . . . , πN}|x
n, j)
[
log |T nP | − log
1
P (xn|{π1, . . . , πN}, j)
]
≤
M
∆
log |T nP |+
∑
xn∈T n
P
P (xn|j∗)
∑
{pi1,...,piN}⊂Sn
P ({π1, . . . , πN}|x
n, j∗)
[
log |T nP | − log
1
P (xn|{π1, . . . , πN}, j∗)
]
= T1 +
∑
xn∈T n
P
P (xn|j∗)
∑
{pi1,...,piN}⊂Sn
P ({π1, . . . , πN}|x
n, j∗)
[
log |T nP | − log
1
P (xn|{π1, . . . , πN}, j∗)
]
,
(48)
where
j∗ , arg max
j:g−1
P
(j)⊂E(g,P,∆)
∑
xn∈T n
P
P (xn|j)
∑
{pi1,...,piN}⊂Sn
P ({π1, . . . , πN}|x
n, j)
[
log |T nP | − log
1
P (xn|{π1, . . . , πN}, j)
]
.
(49)
We consider the second event that permutations are not well spread such that the conditional distribution is not
close to the uniform distribution. We have the following lemma
Lemma 2 For function g, type P , and δ > 0, the random selected permutations Π = {π1, π2, . . . πN}, where πi
is uniformly distributed over Sn, satisfy∣∣∣∣Pr (Xn = xn∣∣Xn ∈ T nP , πK(Xn) ∈ g−1P (j),Π)− 1|T nP |
∣∣∣∣ > δ|T nP | , for g−1P (j) ⊆ E(g, P,∆), (50)
September 17, 2018 DRAFT
12
1) with probability at most
2 exp
(
−
δ2
2(2 + δ)
N
∆
)
, (51)
if π1, π2, . . . πN are mutually independent.
2) with probability at most (
δ2
N
∆
)−1
, (52)
if π1, π2, . . . πN are pairwise independent.
The proof of Lemma 2 is in Appendix B.
Remark: This lemma shows that for a random permutation cipher, the probability, that the conditional probability
Pr
(
Xn = xn
∣∣Xn ∈ T nP , πK(Xn) ∈ g−1P (j),Π) is not close to 1|T nP | , converges to zero as long as the output of the
permutation cipher falls into a “normal” set g−1P (j). However, this probability in the mutually independent case
decays exponentially while the probability in the pairwise independent case is polynomially small.
We then define following set for every xn ∈ T nP , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} with g
−1
P (j) ⊆ E(g, P,∆), and δ > 0
S(xn, j, δ) ,
{
{π1, . . . , πN} ⊂ S
n :
∣∣∣∣P (xn|{π1, . . . , πN}, j)− 1|T nP |
∣∣∣∣ > δ|T nP |
}
, (53)
where S(xn, j, δ) represents the set of permutations ciphers which has a conditional probability P (xn|{π1, . . . , πN}, j)
not close to 1
|T nP |
. Then the above lemma implies
Pr(Π ∈ S(xn, j, δ)|Xn = xn, Xn ∈ T nP , πK(X
n) ∈ g−1P (j), g
−1
P (j) ⊂ E(g, P,∆))
≤

 2 exp
(
− δ
2
2(2+δ)
N
∆
)
for type I permutation cipher(
δ2N∆
)−1 for type II permutation cipher . (54)
We then continue upper bounding the information leakage as follows
I(Xn; gP (πK(X
n))|Xn ∈ T nP ,Π)
≤ T1 +
∑
xn∈T n
P
P (xn|j∗)
∑
{pi1,...,piN}∈S(xn,j∗,δ)
P ({π1, . . . , πN}|x
n, j∗)
[
log |T nP | − log
1
P (xn|{π1, . . . , πN}, j∗)
]
+
∑
xn∈T n
P
P (xn|j∗)
∑
{pi1,...,piN}/∈S(xn,j∗,δ)
P ({π1, . . . , πN}|x
n, j∗)
[
log |T nP | − log
1
P (xn|{π1, . . . , πN}, j∗)
]
≤ T1 + T2 +
∑
xn∈T n
P
P (xn|j∗)
∑
{pi1,...,piN}/∈S(xn,j∗,δ)
P ({π1, . . . , πN}|x
n, j∗)
[
log |T nP | − log
1
P (xn|{π1, . . . , πN}, j∗)
]
.
(55)
We note that for {π1, . . . , πN} /∈ S(xn, j, δ), we have
P (xn|{π1, . . . , πN}, j) ≤
1 + δ
|T nP |
, (56)
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which leads to
log |T nP | − log
1
P (xn|{π1, . . . , πN}, j)
≤ log(1 + δ) ≤ δ, (57)
for a sufficiently small δ > 0. Then we have
I(Xn; gP (πK(X
n))|Xn ∈ T nP ,Π)
≤ T1 + T2 +
∑
xn∈T n
P
P (xn|j∗)
∑
{pi1,...,piN}/∈S(xn,j∗,δ)
P ({π1, . . . , πN}|x
n, j∗)δ
≤ T1 + T2 + δ, (58)
which concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
A permutation πk ∈ Sn is a one-to-one mapping from T nP to T nP . Thus we have
Pr(πk(Xn) = xn|Xn ∈ T nP ) =
1
|T nP |
, xn ∈ T nP , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, (59)
and
Pr(πk(Xn) ∈ g−1P (j)|Xn ∈ T nP ) =
∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣
|T nP |
, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. (60)
By Bayes’ rule, we have
Pr
(
Xn = xn
∣∣Xn ∈ T nP , πK(Xn) ∈ g−1P (j),Π)
= Pr
(
πK(X
n) ∈ g−1P (j)
∣∣Xn = xn, Xn ∈ T nP ,Π) Pr (Xn = xn|Xn ∈ T nP ,Π)
Pr
(
πK(Xn) ∈ g
−1
P (j)
∣∣Xn ∈ T nP ,Π)
= Pr
(
πK(X
n) ∈ g−1P (j)
∣∣Xn = xn, Xn ∈ T nP ,Π) 1∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣ , (61)
where (61) is from (24) and (60).
For a given i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, xn ∈ T nP , we define the random variable χ(i) as
χ(i) ,

 1 πi(x
n) ∈ g−1P (j)
0 πi(x
n) /∈ g−1P (j)
, (62)
which is the function of the random permutation πi and
Pr(χ(i) = 1) =
∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣
|T nP |
. (63)
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Then we have
Pr
(
πK(X
n) ∈ g−1P (j)
∣∣Xn = xn, Xn ∈ T nP ,Π) = 1N
N∑
i=1
χ(i), (64)
where the probability is with respect to the key random variable K , and it depends on the realization of the random
cipher Π. From (61) and (64), we have
Pr
(
Xn = xn
∣∣Xn ∈ T nP , πK(Xn) ∈ g−1P (j),Π) =
N∑
i=1
χ(i)
N
∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣ . (65)
For mutually independent permutations, which translates to mutually independent χ(i) for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, by
applying Chernoff bound, we have for any β > 0
Pr
(
Pr
(
Xn = xn
∣∣Xn ∈ T nP , πK(Xn) ∈ g−1P (j),Π) > 1 + δ|T nP |
)
= Pr
(
β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆
N∑
i=1
χ(i) > β(1 + δ)
N
∆
)
= Pr
(
exp
(
β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆
N∑
i=1
χ(i)
)
> exp
(
β(1 + δ)
N
∆
))
≤ exp
(
−β(1 + δ)
N
∆
)
E
N∏
i=1
exp
(
β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆χ(i)
)
(66)
= exp
(
−β(1 + δ)
N
∆
) N∏
i=1
E exp
(
β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆χ(i)
)
(67)
= exp
(
−β(1 + δ)
N
∆
)(
1 +
∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣
|T nP |
(
exp
(
β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆
)
− 1
))N
, (68)
where (66) is due to Markov’s inequality, (67) is due to the fact that χ(i) are mutually independent for i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N}, and (68) is the calculation of the expectation with the probability from (63).
We note
exp
(
β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆
)
− 1 =
∞∑
k=1
(
β
|T n
P
|
|g−1P (j)|∆
)k
k!
(69)
≤
∞∑
k=1
(
β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆
)k
≤
(
β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆
)
∞∑
k=0
(
β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆
)k
≤
β
|T n
P
|
|g−1P (j)|∆
1− β
|T nP |
|g−1P (j)|∆
, (70)
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where (69) and (70) follows from Taylor expansion. Therefore, we have
1 +
∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣
|T nP |
(
exp
(
β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆
)
− 1
)
≤ 1 +
β
∆
1− β
|T nP |
|g−1P (j)|∆
≤ 1 +
β
∆
1− β
(71)
≤ exp
(
β
∆
1− β
)
= exp
(
β
∆
(
1 +
β
1− β
))
, (72)
where (71) is due to the condition that g−1P (j) ⊂ E(g, P,∆), which implies
|g−1P (j)|
|T nP |
≥ 1∆ . By combining (68) and
(72), and setting β = δ2+δ , we have the following bound
Pr
(
Pr
(
Xn = xn
∣∣Xn ∈ T nP , πK(Xn) ∈ g−1P (j),Π) > 1 + δ|T nP |
)
≤ exp
(
−β(δ −
β
1− β
)
N
∆
)
= exp
(
−
δ2
2(2 + δ)
N
∆
)
. (73)
On the other hand,
Pr
(
Pr
(
Xn = xn
∣∣Xn ∈ T nP , πK(Xn) ∈ g−1P (j),Π) < 1− δ|T nP |
)
= Pr
(
exp
(
−β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆
N∑
i=1
χ(i)
)
> exp
(
−β(1− δ)
N
∆
))
≤ exp
(
β(1 − δ)
N
∆
) N∏
i=1
E exp
(
−β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆χ(i)
)
= exp
(
β(1 − δ)
N
∆
)(
1 +
∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣
|T nP |
(
exp
(
−β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆
)
− 1
))N
. (74)
We note that
exp
(
−β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆
)
− 1 =
∞∑
k=1
(
−β
|T n
P
|
|g−1P (j)|∆
)k
k!
≤ −β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆
(
1−
1
2
β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆
)
(75)
≤ −β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆
(
1−
1
2
β
)
, (76)
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where the inequality in (75) is valid when β ≤ 4. Therefore, we have
1 +
∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣
|T nP |
(
exp
(
−β
|T nP |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆
)
− 1
)
≤ 1−
β
∆
(
1−
1
2
β
)
(77)
≤ exp
(
−
β
∆
(
1−
1
2
β
))
, (78)
where (77) is from (76), and the inequality in (78) is due to Taylor expansion and a sufficiently large ∆. By
combining (74) and (78), and setting β = δ, we obtain the following bound.
Pr
(
Pr
(
Xn = xn
∣∣Xn ∈ T nP , πK(Xn) ∈ g−1P (j),Π) > 1 + δ|T nP |
)
≤ exp
(
−β(δ −
1
2
β)
N
∆
)
= exp
(
−
δ2
2
N
∆
)
. (79)
The above bounds together with the union bound complete the proof of the first assertion of the lemma.
For the pairwise independent permutations, which implies pairwise independent χ(i) for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, we
have
Var
(
N∑
i=1
χ(i)
)
=
N∑
i=1
Var (χ(i)) = N
∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣
|T nP |
(
1−
∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣
|T nP |
)
. (80)
We apply Chebyshev’s inequality and obtain,
Pr
(∣∣∣∣Pr (Xn = xn∣∣Xn ∈ T nP , πK(Xn) ∈ g−1P (j),Π)− 1|T nP |
∣∣∣∣ > δ|T nP |
)
= Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣ |T
n
P |∣∣g−1P (j)∣∣∆
N∑
i=1
χ(i)−
N
∆
∣∣∣∣∣ > δN∆
)
≤
Var
(
|T n
P
|
|g−1P (j)|∆
∑N
i=1 χ(i)
)
(
δN∆
)2
=
N
|g−1P (j)|
|T nP |
(
1−
|g−1P (j)|
|T nP |
)(
|T n
P
|
|g−1P (j)|∆
)2
(
δN∆
)2
=
(
1−
|g−1P (j)|
|T nP |
)(
|T n
P
|
|g−1P (j)|∆
)
δ2N∆
≤
(
δ2
N
∆
)−1
, (81)
where the inequality in (81) is due to the condition that g−1P (j) ⊂ E(g, P,∆), which implies
|g−1P (j)|
|T nP |
≥ 1∆ .
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